There is no doubt that the Greek programme has failed. In 2010 Greek public debt was just over €300bn, mostly privately held, two thirds of it by lenders abroad and governed by Greek law. The rational option would have been for Greece to declare default, seek a rapid restructuring of its debt and place its economy on a new footing. This would probably have meant exiting the European Monetary Union, a move with considerable costs but also major advantages in allowing the Greek economy to make a fresh start. Instead, the EU, led by Germany, decided to "rescue" Greece by offering it massive fresh borrowing, while forcing it to submit to severe austerity and wage cuts. The results have been catastrophic: cumulative economic contraction approaching 25%, adult unemployment at nearly 30%, youth unemployment close to 65%, unprecedented poverty, destruction of the welfare state and humanitarian crisis in the urban centres. Greek debt, meanwhile, is currently higher than in 2010, standing at €321bn and, since the economy has collapsed, its ratio to GDP approaches an exorbitant 180%. This is the background to the current debate. The "rescue" programme has already included a restructuring of Greek debt. Some of it was written off, although most of the losses actually fell on Greek lenders – banks, pension funds and small savers. Its maturity has been lengthened substantially and interest rates have come down dramatically to just over 2%. The problem is that in 2014-15 Greece must still make debt payments of more than €40bn and, since the rescue programme is ending in 2014, it is not clear where these funds will come from. The government has cut spending dramatically and imposed a storm of taxes; it could also use some money left over from the borrowing of the last three years. Even so, it is highly unlikely to make up the entire sum, particularly as its own finances for 2015-16 remain uncertain. This is the immediate reason why Greece might need a fresh package, perhaps up to €20bn.
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